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Summary 
The Hill Cipher is a classical symmetric cipher which breaks 
plaintext into blocks of size 𝑚 and then multiplies each block by 
an  𝑚 × 𝑚 key matrix to yield ciphertext. However, it is well 
known that the Hill cipher succumbs to cryptanalysis relatively 
easily. As a result, there have been efforts to strengthen the 
cipher through the use of various techniques e.g. permuting rows 
and columns of the key matrix to encrypt each plaintext vector 
with a new key matrix. In this paper, we strengthen the security 
of the Hill cipher against a known-plaintext attack by encrypting 
each plaintext matrix by a variable-length key matrix obtained 
from a Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) master key matrix. 
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1. Introduction 
The Hill cipher is a classical symmetric cipher based on 
matrix transformation. It has several advantages including 
its resistance to frequency analysis and simplicity due to 
the fact that it uses matrix multiplication and inversion for 
encryption and decryption. However, it succumbs to the 
known-plaintext attack [4] and as such there have been 
efforts  to  strengthen  the  cipher  through  the  use of 
various techniques which have improved the security of 
the cipher quite significantly [1],[2],[3]. Unlike the 
original Hill cipher the proposed modifications of the Hill 
cipher have practical applications including image 
encryption see for example [6]. 
The method employed in this paper aims at generating 
dynamic variable-length key matrices from a given shared 
MDS master key matrix. With the generated matrices, 
each plaintext matrix is encrypted using a different key 
matrix and this renders the ciphertext immune to a known-
plaintext attack. 
The rest of the paper is divided as follows; in Section 2 the 
basic concept of a Hill cipher is outlined, a literature 
review is in Section 3, Sections 4 and 5 present a 
discussion on MDS matrices and in Section 6 the proposed 
algorithm is described. 
 
2. Hill Cipher 
Let us consider a plaintext string 𝑃 of length 𝑙 defined over 
an alphabet of order 𝑛. Each letter is mapped to an element 
of  ℤ𝑛 . Often 𝑛 = 26 is used and the correspondence 
mostly used is:  A = 0, B = 1, . . . , Z = 25. Additionally, an  
𝑚 × 𝑚 matrix 𝐾 with entries from ℤ𝑛  is chosen as the 
secret key. The encryption and decryption is then given as; 
 
         𝐶 = 𝐾𝑃 mod 𝑛         𝑃 = 𝐾𝐶 mod 𝑛                (1) 
 
where  𝐶 is the ciphertext. For encryption to be possible 𝑃 
is divided into substrings of length  𝑚. If  𝑙, the length of 
the plaintext, is not divisible by 𝑚 then the plaintext block 
must be padded with extra characters. Another 
complication arises when 𝐾 is not invertible. A necessary 
and sufficient condition for a matrix 𝐾 over ℤ𝑛  to be 
invertible is that the determinant of 𝐾 be non-zero and co-
prime to  𝑛. See [7] for the size of the keyspace of a Hill 
cipher. 
3. Literature Review 
Several research works have been done with an aim to 
improve the security of Hill cipher. For example, a method 
HCM-PT  found in [5] tries to make Hill cipher secure by 
using dynamic key matrix  𝐾𝑡obtained by  random 
permutations 𝑀𝑡  of columns and rows of the  master key 
matrix and transfers an encrypted plaintext and encrypted 
permutation vector  𝑢 = 𝐾𝑡  to the receiving side. The 
number of dynamic keys generated is 𝑚! where 𝑚 refers 
to the size of the key matrix.  
HCM-PT   Encryption 
𝐾𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡𝐾𝑀𝑡
−1 
𝐶 = 𝐾𝑡𝑃 
 
𝑢 = 𝐾𝑡 
 
 
Even though this method thwarts the known-plaintext 
attack on the plaintext, it is vulnerable to known-plaintext 
attack on the permutation vector. This prompted [11] to 
modify HCM-PT. 
 
The modification to HCM-PT called SHC-M found in [11] 
works the same way as HCM-PT but does not transfer the 
permutation vector, instead both the sender and the 
receiver use a pseudo-random permutation generator,   
𝑡 = 𝑃𝑅𝑃𝐺 𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑 ,𝑛   and only the number of the necessary 
permutation is transferred to the receiver. The number of 
dynamic keys is the same as HCM-PT. 
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SHC-M Encryption 
1. Sender, S, selects a number,𝑛 
2. calculates 𝑡 = 𝑃𝑅𝑃𝐺 𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑,𝑛   
3. S → R: C,𝑛 xor 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐷 
4. Proceed as in HCM − PT 
 
Another modification to the Hill cipher is found in [6] 
which tries to improve the security of Hill cipher by using 
a one-time-one key matrix to encrypt each plaintext block. 
This unique key is computed by multiplying the current 
key with a secret Initial Vector (IV). However, [10] shows 
that the method is prone to a known-plain text attack. 
The method presented here works the same way as 
SHC-M but our method requires that the master key matrix 
be MDS. With an MDS master key, the key space is bigger 
than that of SHC-M and our method can be used to encrypt 
plaintext blocks of variable length. As far as we know this 
is the first instance of a variable length Hill cipher. 
4. MDS Matrices 
Let 𝐶 be a linear code of length 𝑛, dimension 𝑘, and 
distance 𝑑 with parameters   𝑛, 𝑘,𝑑 . A generator matrix 𝐺 
for a linear 𝐶 is a 𝑘 × 𝑛 matrix whose rows form a basis 
for  𝐶. Linear codes obey the Singleton bound,  
𝑑 ≤ 𝑛 − 𝑘 + 1. If a linear code meets the Singleton bound,  
𝑑 = 𝑛 − 𝑘 + 1, then it is called a Maximum Distance 
Separable code or MDS code. Also, an   𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑑 -error 
correcting code with generator matrix 𝐺 =  𝐼𝑘×𝑘 |𝐴  where 
𝐼𝑘×𝑘 is the 𝑘 × 𝑘 identity matrix, and 𝐴 is a 𝑘 ×  𝑛 − 𝑘  
matrix, is MDS if and only if every square submatrix of 𝐴 
is nonsingular [8]. In most applications e.g. [12] the  code  
𝐶  is  taken  as  a  linear  code  with parameters  
[2𝑘, 𝑘, 𝑘 + 1]and generator matrix 𝐺 =  𝐼𝑘×𝑘 |𝐴𝑘×𝑘 . 
When we take a generator matrix of a linear MDS code 
with parameters [2𝑘, 𝑘, 𝑘 + 1] as 𝐺 =  𝐼𝑘×𝑘 |𝐴𝑘×𝑘  , the 
𝑘 × 𝑘 matrix 𝐴 is the matrix we call MDS matrix. MDS 
matrices are an important building block adopted by 
different block ciphers as they guarantee fast and effective 
diffusion in a small number of rounds. See for example 
[12]. In this paper MDS matrices are used as key matrices 
for a Hill cipher. This modification increases the key space 
of SHC-M because in an MDS matrix every square 
submatrix is non-singular which is the requirement for a 
key matrix of a Hill cipher. 
5. Generating MDS Matrices 
There are different methods of generating MDS matrices 
e.g. using Cauchy and Hadamard matrices. MDS matrices 
can also be generated exhaustively but probably the most 
popular method is to use Reed Solomon Codes. 
6. Variable-Length Hill Cipher 
As pointed out earlier SHC-M has a dynamic key space 
(NDK) of 𝑚! but in this section we show that by requiring 
that the key matrix be MDS we increase the key space of 
SHC-M. We also develop a way of encrypting variable-
length plaintext blocks. 
 
6.1 Enlarging the Key space 
 
We will work as follows; suppose the secret shared MDS 
matrix 𝐾  is of size 𝑚 × 𝑚 where 𝑚 ≥ 3. The cases 
𝑚 = 1, 2 are trivial. Then for each of the 𝑚! permutations 
of the columns of 𝐾we can form 𝑗 × 𝑗 invertible 
submatrices where  𝑗 ∈  2. .𝑚 . Each of these matrices can 
be used for encryption in our method. This can be done by 
choosing columns of a required length from any of the 
permutations. 
Alternatively, we can start by choosing 𝑗 columns from a 
total of 𝑚 columns. We then form 𝑗 × 𝑗 invertible 
submatrices from the  𝑚
𝑗
  columns. Each possible 
submatrix is then permuted to give 𝑗! permuted 
submatrices. We do this for all possible matrix lengths 
𝑗 ∈  2. .𝑚 . It is not difficult to see that the total number of 
dynamic matrices (NDK) is; 
NDK =   
𝑚
𝑗
 
2𝑚
𝑗=2
𝑗! 
Obviously, this number gets bigger as 𝑚 increases. AS fra 
as we know, the number of dynamic keys found here is the 
best of all the known modifications of the Hill cipher. The 
best thing with this method is that it applies to any Hill 
cipher modification which proposes dynamic matrix keys. 
 
We illustrate the method with an example. Let 
 
𝐾 =  
𝑘11
𝑘21
𝑘31
𝑘12
𝑘22
𝑘32
𝑘13
𝑘23
𝑘33
  
 
be a 3 × 3 MDS secret key matrix. Then applying the 
formula above we have 18 matrices of order 2 × 2 and 6 
matrices of order 3 ×  3 giving a total of 24dynamic 
matrices. We now show how to generate all the 24 
matrices. 
 
We begin by choosing 2 columns from 𝐾. We get the 
following matrices, 
𝑘11
𝑘21
𝑘31
𝑘12
𝑘22
𝑘32
 , 
𝑘11
𝑘21
𝑘31
𝑘13
𝑘23
𝑘33
  and  
𝑘12
𝑘22
𝑘32
𝑘13
𝑘23
𝑘33
 . 
From these matrices we form 2 × 2 matrices e.g from 
 
𝑘11
𝑘21
𝑘31
𝑘12
𝑘22
𝑘32
  we get 𝑘11𝑘21
𝑘12
𝑘22
 ,  𝑘11𝑘31
𝑘12
𝑘32
 and  𝑘21𝑘31
𝑘22
𝑘32
 and 
column-permuted versions of these matrices. Continuing 
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in the same fashion and considering the 6 permutations of 
𝐾 we get all 24 dynamic matrices. 
It can be seen that the key space of SHC-M is now 
  𝑚
𝑗
 
2
𝑚
𝑗=2 𝑗!  which is a significant increase from 𝑚!.  This 
number doubles when we permute the dynamic matrices in 
a row wise manner. The key space can also be increased 
by using 𝑗 × 𝑗 matrices to form 2𝑗 × 2𝑗 matrices for 
encryption. For example, if we have the 4 𝑗 × 𝑗 matrices  
𝐾1,𝐾2,𝐾3 and 𝐾4 we may, 𝑤𝑙𝑜𝑔, form a new matrix; 
𝐾∗ =  
𝐾1
𝐾3
𝐾2
𝐾4
  
 
6.2. Encryption and Decryption 
 
Encryption is the same as SHC-M but we require that we 
choose a control key (preferably binary) to govern 
encryption, see [13]. This key determines the length of 
block to encrypt i.e. when to encrypt a 2 × 2 block, a 
3 × 3 block and so on. To avoid having too many secret 
keys we can use the seed as the control key but a problem 
may arise when we have to expand the seed due to a long 
plaintext. Once we have the binary control key we set up a 
correspondence between binary strings and block lengths. 
For example, if 𝑚 = 4 then the possible lengths of 
subkeys are 2, 3 and 4 therefore we can have the following 
set up; 
01 → 2, 10 → 3 and 11 → 4. 
 
This means we read the control key two bits at a time and 
encrypt block lengths accordingly. It is therefore very 
important that the control key be random to prevent 
attacks. We now give a full description of the proposed  
method: 
Algorithm 1: Encryption 
Data: Plaintext P, K, SEED, Control Key 
Result: Cipher Text, C 
begin 
 𝑟 ← block number 
 𝑡 = PRPG(SEED, 𝑟) ← a permutation order 
 𝑀𝑡 ← a permutation from 𝑡 
 𝐾𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡𝐾𝑀𝑡
−1 ← encryption matrix 
 Determine block length 𝑚 from control key 
 Obtain a length 𝑚 encryption matrix 𝐾𝑚 from 𝐾𝑡  
 Get plaintext of length 𝑚,𝑃𝑚 , from P 
 Encrypt using 𝐶 = 𝐾𝑚𝑃𝑚  
 Send C, r xor SEED 
end  
 
Algorithm 2: Decryption 
Data: Ciphertext C, K, SEED, Control Key 
Result: Plaintext, P 
begin 
 Calculate 𝑡 from SEED and 𝑟 
 Calculate 𝑀𝑡 ; Calculate 𝐾𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡𝐾𝑀𝑡
−1 
 Get 𝑚 from control key 
 Obtain 𝐾𝑚  from  𝐾𝑡  
 Decrypt using 𝑃𝑚 = 𝐾𝑚
−1𝐶𝑚   
end 
 
From the encryption algorithm one easily sees that the 
sender and receiver need to find a way of obtaining a 
length 𝑚 encryption matrix 𝐾𝑚  from 𝐾𝑡 . One way could 
be to take matrices in a left-right then top-bottom manner. 
It is worth noting that there are different ways of choosing 
variable-length matrices from 𝐾𝑡  and this strengthens the 
proposed algorithm even more. 
7. Security Analysis 
The main limitation with Hill Cipher is that it is  prone  to  
a  known  plaintext  attack, that is, if an attacker has 𝑚 
distinct plaintext and ciphertext pairs then they can  
retrieve the key by solving 𝐾 = 𝑃−1𝐶 or 𝐾 = 𝐶𝑃−1 
depending  on  the encryption equation used [6]. If 𝑃 is not 
invertible, then other sets of 𝑚 plaintext-ciphertext pairs 
have to be tried. By encrypting variable-length blocks of 
plaintext the proposed method is safe from known 
plaintext attacks. Also the proposed method inherits 
immunity from a cipher-text only attack from the original 
Hill cipher.  The proposed method does not, however, 
introduce sufficient confusion and diffusion to be ranked 
among the best and efficient symmetric key 
cryptosystems. It is worth pointing out that the proposed 
algorithm relies on many matrix transformations and this 
slows down the algorithm. 
8. Conclusion 
We have presented a variable-length Hill cipher which is a 
modification of the original Hill cipher. It is also based on 
SHC-M which is itself also a modification of the Hill 
cipher. Our method strengthens the Hill cipher against 
known-plaintext and ciphertext only attacks. The former is 
due to the use of dynamically changing key matrices. Our 
method is better than the methods found in the review in 
that it has a larger key space. On the downside our method 
is not efficient due to the use of many matrix operations.  
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